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In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident 
Manufacturers in Product Liability 
Actions 
Nationwide distribution of merchandise has created a likeli-
hood that persons injured by defective products will reside in a 
state far distant from the manufacturer's principal place of business. 
In order to provide a more convenient forum for their citizens, many 
state legislatures have enacted "long-arm" statutes enabling suit to 
be brought in the state where the plaintiff resides.1 Two basic prob-
lems are encountered in attempting to gain jurisdiction over the non-
resident manufacturer. The first results from constitutional limita-
tions upon the assertion of judicial power over nonresidents. The 
Supreme Court has articulated this issue in terms of fairness to the 
defendant in requiring him to defend in a foreign state, with fairness 
conclusively established when the cause of action is related to a pur-
poseful contact of the defendant with the state in which jurisdiction 
is sought.2 The second problem is simply a matter of statutory 
construction. Does the language of the "long-arm" provision en-
compass what the plaintiff alleges the nonresident manufacturer has 
done? For example, when dealing with a statute that confers juris-
diction over defendants who commit a "tortious act" within the 
state,3 there is some question whether the tortious act in a product 
liability case is committed outside the state, at the time of manu-
facture, or within the state, at the time of injury. 
A wide divergence of opinion exists regarding the wisdom as well 
as the constitutionality of extensive jurisdiction through the use of 
liberally drafted and construed "long-arm" statutes.4 Hesitance may 
I. The following are among those states having "long-arm" statutes: Alabama, 
Arkansas, California, Connec:ticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon• 
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
2. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life 
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 810 
(1945). For an analysis of the evolution of the limitations on in personam juris• 
diction over nonresidents, see Kurland, .The Supreme Court, The Due Process 
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 569 
(1958). 
3. E.g., ILL. RE.v. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959); N.Y. CIV. PRAC, LAW § 802; WASH. 
REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (1959). 
4. See generally Cardozo, The Reach of the Legislature and the Grasp of 
Jurisdiction, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 210 (1957); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm-
Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Kurland, 
supra note 2; Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of 
Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. RE.v. 249 (1959); Sobeloff, Jurisdiction Over Non-
Residents in Our Federal Jurisdiction, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196 (1957); Stimson, Omnibus 
Statutes Designed To Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 48 A.B.A.J. 
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result from a fear of burdening a defendant with the inconvenience 
and expense of a foreign suit brought against him solely for the 
purpose of harassment. While this comment does not advocate the 
extent to which a court should assert the jurisdictional powers con-
ferred on it by a given "long-arm" provision, it examines the scope 
of jurisdiction constitutionally permissible over nonresident manu-
facturers in product liability cases with a view toward formulating 
administrable standards that a court may utilize to reconcile the 
varieties of commercial activity with the now-frequently-frustrated 
legislative goal of providing injured plaintiffs with a convenient 
forum. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST OF FAIRNESS 
A. Supreme Court Pronouncements 
In International Shoe Co. v. W ashington,15 the state of Washing-
ton sued a nonresident defendant for unpaid contributions to the 
state unemployment compensation fund. The alleged basis of lia-
bility was the in-state activities of defendant's salesmen. Upholding 
jurisdiction in Washington, the Supreme Court stated that a non-
resident is amenable to jurisdiction wherever he has established 
certain "minimum contacts" within a foreign state.6 The test did 
not call for a quantitative analysis of defendant's in-state activities 
to see if some numerical threshold had been exceeded. Rather, the 
nature and quality of the activities were to be balanced against the 
burden of requiring the nonresident to defend in a distant forum. 7 
If the judicial scales indicated that the former preponderated, main-
tenance of the suit would not offend "traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice."8 
However, the flexible factor of judicial sensitivity for the defend-
ant was all but eliminated, and the test acquired a more objective 
nature, in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.9 The Court there sus-
tained jurisdiction in a suit against a nonresident insurance company 
to collect life insurance proceeds where the company's only contact 
with the forum was the mailing of the policy to an in-state resident 
725 (1962); Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. R.Ev. 909 
(1960), 
5. 826 U.S. 310 (1945) (hereinafter cited as International Shoe). 
6. Id. at 317. 
7. "Those demands [of due process] may be met by such contacts of the 
corporation with ,the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of 
our federal system of government, ,to require the corporation to defend the 
particular suit which is brought there. An 'estimate of inconveniences' which would 
result to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of 
business is relevant in this connection." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
8. Id. at 316. 
9. 855 U.S. 220 (1957) (hereinafter cited as McGee). 
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and the acceptance of premiums by return mail. The decision did 
not necessarily depart from precedent because a single in-state act 
in an activity regulated by the forum had long been recognized as 
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.10 However, while the Court referred 
to the "manifest interest" of the state in providing a forum, it was a 
restricted version of the minimum contacts thesis of International 
Shoe, rather than the rationale of cases dealing with regulated 
activities, that controlled the decision.11 Thus, a fair interpretation 
of McGee is that jurisdiction over a nonresident is permissible 
whenever he voluntarily performs a single act within the forum, 
provided, of course, that the asserted cause of action is related to 
the single act upon which jurisdiction is predicated. 
The Supreme Court, however, has issued a caveat to those who 
would utilize McGee to authorize nationwide service of process by 
state courts. In Hanson v. Denckla,12 the residuary legatees of a will 
instituted proceedings in a Florida court to invalidate an inter 
vivos trust created by a Pennsylvania resident with a Delaware trust 
company, the settlor having subsequently moved to Florida. Under 
Florida law, the nonresident trustee was an indispensable party 
to the suit, his absence being a jurisdictional defect. Correspondence 
between the settlor and the trustee was the trustee's only connec-
tion with the forum. The Supreme Court ruled that a third party 
could not unilaterally impose the contacts requisite for jurisdiction 
upon a nonresident who did not himself "purposefully" institute 
a relationship with the foreign state.13 
10. E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (nonresident motorist subject to 
jurisdiction under nonresident motorist statute for injuries caused within the 
forum state). Under the McCarran Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1011-15 (1958), the federal government recognizes the wide powers of a state 
over insurance activities within its borders. The forum state of California in McGee 
had exercised these regulatory powers. CAL. INs. CoDE §§ 1610-20. 
11. McGee cited with apparent approval two state court decisions which upheld 
jurisdiction over nonresidents who committed single tortious acts within the forum 
while conducting unregulated actitivity there: S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 
P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954) (breach of warranty action with contact made by independent 
sales representative); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 
664 (1951) (corporate agent committed tort in forum). See McGee v. International 
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 n.2 (1957). 
12. 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Hanson). 
13. Id. at 253. The court explained that the defendant must act in a manner to 
invoke the "benefits and protection" of the laws of the forum state. 
This statement, being a conclusion of law, has offered little aid in solving the 
problems that surround the test for "minimum contacts." After considering the 
impact of Hanson on jurisdictional inquiry, the court in DeVeny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 
319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963), concluded that the constitutional test had been un-
4}anged: "Thus, the long arm of state courts is permitted to reach out-of-state 
defendants only in suits growing out of acts which have created contacts with the 
forum state, however limited or transient such contracts may be." Id. at 127. (Emphasis 
added.) It has been similarly held that a nonresident manufacturer, who supplies 
a component part ,to another nonresident manufacturer, invokes the "benefits and 
protection" of the laws of the forum state to which the latter manufacturer ships 
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B. Jurisdictional Principles in Product Liability Actions 
In all product liability cases, one contact with the forum always 
exists-the product itself. Thus, the question is presented whether 
this single factor is a sufficient foundation upon which to assert 
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident manufacturer in a suit 
arising from this contact. If the presence of the product resulted 
from direct shipment by the manufacturer, the existence of a juris-
dictionally sufficient relationship is evident.14 However, the fortui-
ties of product migration do not always permit an automatic associa-
tion of product location with a deliberate act of the manufacturer 
within the forum state. The movement of the product may have 
been effected by the consumer or by independent middlemen. Or, 
it may have resulted from the distribution of a secondary manu-
facturer who purchased the defendant's product as a component 
for his goods, the component proving to be the defective item. 
Since the manufacturer over whom personal jurisdiction is sought 
may have had no control over the process by which his product 
reached the forum, the attribution to the nonresident of a purpose-
fully instituted relationship becomes less meaningful. The language 
of McGee and Hanson, which speak of contacts emanating directly 
from the defendant, seems inapposite where such intimacy is lack-
ing. Therefore, fairness to the nonresident, within the meaning 
of International Shoe, must be formulated with reference to broader 
considerations when the presence of the product stems from a more 
circuitous route than direct shipment. 
It would seem consonant with fairness to subject the manufac-
turer to jurisdiction whenever his product gave rise to the cause of 
action within the forum state, even though the manufacturer had 
no other contact in the state. As far as the manufacturer's economic 
objectives are concerned, his overriding purpose is to have his 
product consumed. Where this consumption occurs is relatively 
insignificant to him. This observation supports the position that 
the manufacturer can be summoned to defend a cause of action 
arising out of the use of his product wherever it may bt;. located.15 
the completely assembled product. Gray v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 1'76 N.E.2d '761 (1961). 
14. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
15. See Feathers v. McLucas, 152 N.Y.L.J. col. 1, p. I (App. Div., 3d Dept., Aug. 4, 
1964) CTurisdiction sustained over a nonresident manufacturer of fuel tanks for use 
on truck beds. The tank had been supplied to an out-of-state fuel truck manu-
facturer who sold the truck to another out-of-state fuel distributor. Plaintiff 
sustained injuries when the tank exploded in New York, a state with which the 
manufacturer had no other contacts.) But cf. Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 
F.R.D. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1960) Gurisdiction in North Carolina unconstitutional where 
motorist's injury in North Carolina was caused by negligent repairs performed in 
South Carolina by defendant garage). 
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Any inconvenience that may be asserted is more than balanced by 
his interest in defending the integrity of his product, the mainte-
nance of which may ultimately determine his economic success. 
There can be no unfairness in forbidding the manufacturer to 
disassociate himself from his product. In sum, the manufacturer 
should be amenable to personal jurisdiction wherever the product 
causes injury,16 wherever he may consensually submit to jursdic-
tion,17 and wherever he may have purposefully established direct 
connections with the forum.18 
C. An Analysis of State Court Decisions 
A number of courts have sustained jurisdiction where a corpo-
rate agent's in-state activities were related to the cause of action.19 
Although it is difficult to project what these courts would have held 
had the agent not visited the forum, an increasing number of states 
are exercising jurisdiction although the defendant's only activity was 
16. Feathers v. McLucas, supra note 15. 
17. Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). 
18. Chovan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours 8: Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 
1963) (direct shipment of $130,000 worth of dynamite safety fuses into forum over a 
two-year period sufficient for jurisdiction when fuse exploded, injuring plaintiff 
within forum); Sheridan v. Cadet Chem. Corp., 25 Conn. Supp. 17, 195 A.2d 766 
(1963) (direct shipment of negligently packed chemicals); Singer v. Walker, 21 App. 
Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964) (direct shipment of geologist's hammer to the forum 
state sufficient for jurisdiction over action for an out-of-state injury); cf. Shealy v. 
Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962) (employee's deliveries to forum 
sufficient); Aldridge v. Marco Chem. Co., 234 Ark. 1080, 356 S.W .2d 615 (1962) 
(employee's delivery to forum sufficient); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 12!1 
Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963) (dictum). Compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 
355 U.S. 220 (1957). See Currie, supra note 4; Reese 8: Galston, supra note 4. 
19. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); DeVeny v. 
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (salesmen in addition to a substantial 
volume of sales); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 
(4th Cir. 1962) (independent agent in addition to a continuous traffic of goods); 
Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., supra note 18 (employees' deliveries); Berk v. Gordon 
Johnson Co., 212 F. Supp. 365 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (salesmen and direct shipment of 
product with employees installing defective equipment in forum state); Ewing v. 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962) (presence of corporate 
agent); Connecticut Tool 8: Mfg. Co. v. Bowsteel Distrib., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 290, 
190 A.2d 236 (1963) (salesmen in addition to substantial sales volume); Shepard v. 
Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959) (salesmen in addition to large 
sales volume); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. App. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) (em-
ployee committed tort in forum); S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 
(Okla. 1954) (presence of independent sales representative); Smyth v. Twin State Im-
provement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) (employee committed tort in forum 
state); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d !105 (196!1) (in addition to other 
factors, defendant's president visited the purchaser of the product); Huck v. Chicago 
St. P., M. 8: O. Ry., 4 Wis. 2d 132, 90 N.W.2d 154 (1958) (sales office in forum state). 
Cf. Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Co., 224 F.Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 196!1) (sales-
men's activities unrelated to the cause of action); Mays v. Oxford Paper Co., 195 
F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (salesmen's activities unrelated to the cause of action); 
Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964) (salesmen's activities 
unrelated to cause of action, but in-state retailer solicited by catalog). But see 
Mueller v. Steelcase Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959) (salesmen in forum state). 
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shipping the product to the forum where the plaintiff was injured.20 
The rationale previously suggested for jurisdiction in product lia-
bility actions agrees with these latter cases as to the low threshold 
of required contact, but departs from those cases requiring that 
the defendant should have been able to foresee contact with the 
particular forum state.21 
In Gray v. American Radiator &- Standard Sanitary Corp.,22 ju-
risdiction was sustained in a suit to recover damages for injuries 
received in Illinois when a defective valve caused a hot water 
heater to explode. The defendant had manufactured the defective 
valve in Pennsylvania and supplied it to an Ohio corporation, which 
incorporated the valve into the water heater and shipped it for sale 
into Illinois. Jurisdiction was sustained because the product had 
created a jurisdictional contact out of which the cause of action 
arose. While the court felt that the defendant should have been 
able to foresee the product's eventual distribution in Illinois,28 this 
factor should not be considered important because the shipment 
by the assembling manufacturer was only a continuation of the 
flow of the defendant's economic endeavors. An intermediate manu-
facturer is integral to and only a furtherance of the original manu-
facturer's enterprise and marketing activities; therefore, the original 
manufacturer should be deemed to have a contact with the forum 
state sufficient to sustain jurisdiction over it. 
It is more difficult to sustain jurisdiction in a state where the 
injury, but not the product's distribution, has occurred. However, 
20. Hutchinson v. Boyd 8c Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960); 
Sheridan v. Cadet Chem. Corp., 25 Conn. Supp. 17, 195 A.2d 766 (1963); Gray v. 
American Radiator 8c Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); 
Ehlers v. United States Heating 8c Cooling Mfg. Co., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 
(1963); Atkins v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960). 
Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Williams v. Connolly, 
227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964) (dictum); Chovan v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours 
Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1963) (direct shipment of $130,000 worth of 
dynamite safety fuses into forum over a two-year period sufficient for jurisdiction 
when a fuse injured plaintiff within forum); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 
Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963) (dictum). 
21. E.g., O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., supra note 20. Jurisdiction was refused 
over a nonresident food processor in a suit for injuries caused by the sale of its 
product in the forum where the only allegation of contact was that the defendant 
placed its product "into the stream of commerce" in Newark, New York. The 
court refused to infer foreseeability of use in the forum state as was done in Gray 
v. American Radiator 8c Standard Sanitary Corp., .supra note 20. This reluctance may 
have been due to the pronounced difference in size of the two companies or to a 
difference in state policies with respect to jurisdiction over nonresidents. In any event, 
the proposed test rejects the foreseeability distinction as far as due process limita-
tions are concerned. The plaintiff need only allege either distribution or injury in 
the forum. Undoubtedly, the language in Hanson troubled the court since a 
"purposeful" connection between the forum and the defendant is difficult to find in 
the context of such indirect distribution. 
22. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
25. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 764, 
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the manufacturer's economic purposes are still being effectuated 
wherever his products are being consumed. The manufacturer 
has taken the initiative in marketing his product for public con-
sumption and jurisdiction should be sustained wherever this enter-
prise causes injury. It is not unfair to subject a manufacturer to 
suit where his product causes injury when it is being used for the 
purpose for which it was designed.24 
In accord with this theory is Feathers v. McLucas,25 in which a 
New York appellate court overruled a lower court's refusal of 
jurisdiction. The defendant was a nonresident manufacturer of fuel 
tanks for installation on truck beds, and his only contact with the 
forum was the existence of the product which caused the injury. 
He had supplied the defective tank to another out-of-state manu-
facturer who assembled the truck and sold it to a Pennsylvania fuel 
distributor operating in interstate commerce. The plaintiff sustained 
injuries when the tank exploded on a New York highway. The 
court held that the defendant was amenable to suit in New York 
even though his marketing activities had terminated in another 
state. 
The state where the injury has occurred is not, however, the 
only state which may exercise jurisdiction over a product liability 
action.. In Singer v. Walker,26 the plaintiff was injured in Connecti-
24. In the application of this theory it is not necessary to determine whether 
the product is particularly dangerous as was done in Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal 
Prods. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961) (electric "deep fry" insufficiently 
dangerous to warrant jurisdiction). This issue goes to the question of whether 
the plaintiff may have a cause of action in implied warranty, not whether the 
court may entertain the litigation. 
The argument that a foreign suit is a burden on interstate commerce, a doctrine 
whose current vitality is questionable, seems to have been limited to cases where 
the defendant is a foreign common carrier operating in interstate commerce. Compare 
Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923) (jurisdictional statute 
violated commerce clause of the Constitution), with Baltimore &: O.R.R. v. Kepner, 
314 U.S. 44 (1941) (limiting Davis to its facts) and Standard Oil Co. v. Superior 
Ct., 44 Del 538, 62 A.2d 454 (1948), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial fed-
eral question, 336 U.S. 930 (1949). See generally McGowan, Litigation as a Burden 
on Interstate Commerce, 33 ILL L. REv. 875 (1939); Comment, Jurisdiction Over 
Non-Resident Carriers as Limited by Doctrine of Unreasonable Burden on Inter-
state Commerce, 34 MICH. L. REv. 979 (1936). 
25. 152 N.Y.L.J. col. I, p. 1 (App. Div., 3d Dep't, Aug. 4, 1964), But see Arundel 
Crane Service v. Thew Shovel Co., 214 Md. 387, 135 A.2d 428 (1957); Moss v. 
City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961). 
26. 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Singer); cf. 
Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962) (foreign airplane 
crash; the basis for jurisdiction was a contract to be partly performed within the 
forum with an additional contact by a corporate agent). Compare McAvoy v. Texas 
E. Transmission Corp., 185 F. Supp. 784 (W .D. Ark. 1960), where the court declined 
jurisdiction but indicated it would have reached a different result if the defendant 
had sufficient contacts with the forum, regardless of the situs of injury. 
If the cause of action arises in a foreign state that is unrelated to the defendant's 
activities within the forum, it is generally accepted that jurisdiction may be exer-
cised within the forum only if the defendant has engaged in relatively continuous 
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cut by a geologist's hammer which had been purchased by his 
aunt in New York.27 The defendant had manufactured the hammer 
in Illinois and shipped it directly to a New York retailer. Since the 
plaintiff was a New York resident, he sought jurisdiction there. 
The court sustained jurisdiction on the theory that the sale in New 
York created a relationship between the parties without which the 
injury would not have occurred. The Singer holding was, of course, 
correct even under the more traditional theories requiring a pur-
poseful and foreseeable contact with the forum. The hammer had 
been shipped directly to New York and the incidence of out-of-state 
injury did not affect the defendant's expectations of contact. The 
same result should be reached even if the product were shipped 
to New York by intermediaries with no subjective expectations of 
contact there on the part of the defendant. The sale of products 
to a consumer is a contact that is purposefully sought by manufac-
turers; if the cause of action arises from such activity, the manu-
facturer should be subject to suit wherever this endeavor is consum-
mated. 
II. THE "LONG-ARM" STATUTES 
Statutory authority must exist before a state can exercise juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant. The "long-arm" statutes, 
through which jurisdiction is accomplished, follow no definite 
pattern except for some usual interstate borrowing. A number of 
states have statutes that specifically extend jurisdiction to non-
residents whose out-of-state acts create consequences within the 
forum.28 These statutes are especially suited to product liability 
and important activities there. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 
437 (1952) (main office of a Philippine corporation in Ohio during World War II). 
Compare Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 235 F. Supp. 257 (W .D. Mich. 1964) (pres-
ence of salesmen in addition to a systematic business in the forum state held to 
be sufficient activity for jurisdiction over a cause of action accruing outside that 
state and unrelated to defendant's in-state activity), with Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l 
Airline, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2240 (N.Y. App. Div., Nov. 22, 1964) (in-state ticket reserva-
tion office which did not accept, but forwarded, reservations was insufficient 
activity to sustain jurisdiction over suit for damages arising from a European 
airplane crash). 
27. It is generally unnecessary that the plaintiff also be the purchaser of the 
product because of the trend to abolish the requirement of privity in product 
liability actions. See Jaeger, Product Liability-The Constructive Warranty, 39 
NoTRE DAME LAW. 501, 504-05 (1964). 
Singer also indicates that where direct shipment is involved, it is irrelevant 
for jurisdictional purposes where title may have passed. 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 
N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964). 
28. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 34-411(c) (1959); FLA. STAT. §§ 47.16 (Supp. 1964); 
MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.715 (1962): N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(3) (1960); WIS. 
STAT. § 262.05(4) (1963). The benefits of some statutes, however, are limited to 
resident plaintiffs. See MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964). The constitution-
ality of such "door-closing" may be questioned. Cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 
(1951) (semble); Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920). 
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cases where the injury occurs within the forum state. The remain-
ing statutes vary from those using the old "doing business" termi-
nology29 to those predicating jurisdiction on the commission of an 
"act" within the state,80 some statutes qualifying the nature of this 
act by requiring it to be "tortious"31 or "part" of a tort.82 
These statutes should be liberally construed to achieve their 
intended objective. Assuming the various state legislatures intended 
to confer the maximum jurisdictional powers on their courts that 
will comport with due process limitations, a suggested approach to 
interpretation of the statutes is to direct attention to the three 
causal elements which are essential to the manufacturer's liability: 
the defective manufacture, the distribution of the product to the 
purchaser, and the resulting injury. For example, viewed in this 
manner, it seems apparent that the shipment of a product to the 
forum is an act committed by the defendant. If there is an inter-
mediate distributor who is also a nonresident, his activity is but 
a continuation of the defendant's act of shipment. Using similar 
reasoning, the negligent manufacture and the resultant injury are 
also acts which, if occurring in the forum state, would sustain juris-
diction. All three elements, i.e., manufacture, distribution, and in-
jury, are parts of the tort, for they represent phases of the continuum 
of events leading to the cause of action. While a court's interpreta-
tion of a statute should reflect legislative policy toward subjecting 
a nonresident to suit, unnecessarily restrictive results have occurred 
all too often that could have been avoided by this approach. 
A. The Battle of Semantics 
The following examples should reflect the semantic difficulties 
the courts have had as they have tried to cope with the language 
of various long-arm statutes. These difficulties have led to confusion 
in this area of the law and frequent frustration of legislative intent. 
The California Code of Civil Procedure prescribes jurisdiction 
over any nonresident corporation that is "doing business in this 
29. E.g., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CoDE § 411(2): ILL. REv. STAT. ch. Il0, § 17(l)(a) (1959); 
KY. REv. STAT. § 271.610(2) (1962); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 660-7ll (1962): N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-3-6(b) (1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 471 (1961); WIS. STAT, § 262.05 
(l)(d) (1963). See also MAss. LA.ws ANN. ch. 181, § 3A (Supp. 1964) (cause of action 
"arising out of business in this state''); N.H. REv. STAT, ANN. ch. 300, § II (1955) 
("transacting business" in state). 
30. See PA. Bus. CoRP. LAw § IOIIB (1951), which also requires that the defendant 
have done business in the state. 
31. E.g., ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. Il0, § 17 (1959); N.Y. CIV. PR.Ac. LAW § 302; WASH. 
REv. CODE§ 4.28.185 (1959). See also CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 33-4Il(c) (1959) ("tortious 
conduct" in forum state); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(4) (1955) ("tortious conduct" in 
forum state). 
32. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 803.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964); TEX. CIV. STAT, art. 203l(b), 
j 4 (1959); VT, STAT • .ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1959); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 3083 (1961). 
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state."88 The "doing business" theory formerly required that the 
corporation transact a substantial amount of business within the 
state-enough so that it could possibly be sued on a cause of action 
entirely divorced from its activities there.34 But with a progressive 
attitude, the California courts have held that the statute grants 
them authority to exercise jurisdiction whenever such action is 
consistent with contemporary notions of due process.35 They have 
thereby been able to assume jurisdiction when the plaintiff sus-
tained injury within the state and the defendant's activity, other 
than the presence of his product, amounted to no more than ad-
vertising in a medical journal36 or solicitation through an "inde-
pendent" sales representative.37 
The Pennsylvania "long-arm" statute similarly requires that the 
defendant be "doing business" in the state. It, however, affords addi-
tional protection to the defendant by providing: 
"Any foreign corporation which shall have done business in 
this Commonwealth . . . shall be conclusively presumed to 
have designated the Secretary of the Commonwealth as its true 
and lawful attorney authorized to accept, on its behalf, service 
of process in any action arising out of acts or omissions of such 
corporation within this Commonwealth."38 
A federal court first interpreted this section in the context of a 
product liability action in Florio v. Powder Power Tool Corp.89 
The court assumed jurisdiction, concluding that the resultant in-
jury within the forum was an "act" flowing from the defendarit's 
negligent manufacture in a foreign state. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court later disapproved this construction in Rufo v. Bastian-Bless-
ing Co.,40 saying that the only act in a product liability action is 
!!!!. CAL. Civ. PROC. ConE § 411(2). "Doing business" or "transacting business" 
statutes are particularly useful in gaining jurisdiction over a cause of action arising 
in a foreign state tbat is unrelated to tbe defendant's activities within tbe forum. 
See Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 235 F. Supp. 257 (W.D. Mich. 1964). See also Wxs. 
STAT. § 262.05(l)(d) (Supp. 1965). 
!14. See Kurland, supra note 2. 
!15. E.g., Empire Steel Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 823, 366 P.2d 502 
(1961). See Note, 10 HAsnNcs L.J. 206 (1958). Similar treatment has been accorded 
tbe New Hampshire "doing business" statute. See W. H. Elliot &: Sons Co. v. 
Nuodex Prods. Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1957). 
!16. Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal, App. 2d 211, 325 P.2d 21 
(1958). See also Florence Nightingale School of Nursing, Inc. v. Superior Court, 168 
Cal. App. 2d 74, !!35 P .2d 240 (1959) (mail solicitation and correspondence courses). 
!17. Cosper v. Smith &: Wesson Arms Co., 5!l Cal. 2d 77, !!46 P.2d 409 (1959), 
cert. denied, !!62 U.S. 927 (1960). 
!l8. PA. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1011B (1951). (Emphasis added.) 
!l9. 248 F.2d !!67 (!ld Cir. 1957). Accord, Mays v. Oxford Paper Co., 195 F. Supp. 
414 (E.D. Pa. 1961). 
40. 405 Pa. 12, 17!! A.2d 123 (1961). It should be pointed out tbat tbe court 
expressly recognized tbat tbe legislature had not chosen to exercise "tbe full 
extent of jurisdiction" tbat it might constitutionally have done. Id. at 21. 
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that of negligent manufacture, which admittedly had not occurred 
"within this Commonwealth." Since the product had been shipped 
to the forum by the initial consumer as a second-hand article and 
the defendant's distributive activity had terminated six years before 
in another state, the court was correct in holding that the defendant 
had committed no act in Pennsylvania. But by disapproving Florio 
and indicating that even the direct shipment of a product to the 
forum is not an "act," Pennsylvania, under its present statute, has dis-
carded any possibility of providing a forum for its citizens who are 
injured by a product manufactured in a foreign state. 
The Illinois statute omits the requirement of "doing business." 
It, however, compounds the interpretative problems associated with 
the words "act within this state" by requiring that the cause of 
action arise from "the commission of a tortious act within this 
state."41 In Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,42 the plaintiff sued 
for injuries received from a power lawn mower negligently manu-
factured in a foreign state. The federal district court held that in 
product liability cases the only tortious act is the negligent manu-
facture. Therefore, the mere fact of injury within the forum would 
not permit jurisdiction under the statute. However, the Illinois 
Supreme Court subsequently disapproved Hellreigel, citing the 
Restatement of the Law of Confiict of Laws48 for the proposition 
that the place of wrong is where the last event necessary for liability 
occurs.'4 Under this analysis, the injury rather than the negligence 
completes the cause of action in tort and it alone satisfies the 
statutory necessity of a "tortious act."45 
The West Virginia Code is similar to the Illinois "tortious act" 
statute in that it provides for jurisdiction as follows: 
"A foreign corporation not authorized to do business in this 
state . . . shall nonetheless be deemed to be doing business 
herein if such corporation makes a contract to be performed, 
in whole or in part, by any party thereto, in this State, or if it 
commits a tort in whole or in part in this State."46 
It would initially seem that jurisdictional issues could be solved 
41. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. no, § 17 (1959) (Emphasis added.) See also N.Y. CIV. PR.Ac. 
LAW § 302; WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.185 (1959). 
42. 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Cf. Dimeo v. Minster Mach. Co., 225 F. Supp. 
569 (D. Conn. 1963) ("tortious conduct" committed only at place of negligent 
manufacture). 
43. REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1934). See also GoODRICH, CONFLICT 
OF LAws § 92 (3d ed. 1949). 
44. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 
N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
45. Cf. Feathers v. McLucas, 152 N.Y.L.J. col. I, p. 1 (N.Y. App. Div., Aug. 
4, 1964); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963). 
46. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3083 (1961). (Emphasis added.) See also MINN. STAT. 
§ 303.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964); TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 203l(b), § 4 (1959); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, § 855 (1958). 
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more readily under this provision than under the Illinois statute 
because there is no express requirement of an "act," and the specified 
event need be only "part" of a tort, thereby omitting the trouble-
some requirement that it be expressly "tortious." This provision of 
the West Virginia Code has been interpreted, however, to be appli-
cable only when the corporation or its agent is present in the state 
at the time of the commission of an alleged tort.47 A West Virginia 
plaintiff, therefore, may never obtain jurisdiction in a product 
liability case where the negligence occurred outside the forum unless 
the product is personally delivered to the state by an agent of the 
corporation who remains there until the injury occurs or unless the 
corporation makes a contract to be performed, in part at least, in 
the state. 
In Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc.,48 a Minnesota federal court reached 
the same result as West Virginia with an identical statute.49 The 
court, however, interpreted the statute with an eye more colored 
by constitutional considerations than by statutory language because 
it said: "If jurisdiction were sustained . . . the door would be open 
to practically unlimited jurisdiction over foreign corporations and 
the concept of the required contacts and connections . . . would 
be whittled away."50 The Mueller interpretation was disapproved 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Atkins v. ] ones &- Laughlin Steel 
Corp.51 The Atkins court approached the problem by considering 
the various parts of a tort and concluded that because injury is an 
indispensable element to recovery in tort, it is a "part" of a tort. 
Since the injury had occurred within the forum, the court sustained 
jurisdiction. 
This wide divergence in statutory construction has made it ex-
tremely difficult for a state legislature to enact a "long-arm" 
statute which it can be reasonably certain will be construed in ac-
cordance with a legislative intent to confer maximum jurisdictional 
capabilities. An examination of the recently enacted Michigan 
statute discloses the decisions with which the legislature had to 
contend, and the qualifying language necessary to prevent a mis-
construction: 
"The existence of any of the following relationships between a 
corporation or its agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient 
basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state 
to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over such corporation 
and to enable such courts to render personal judgments against 
47. Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F.Supp. 571 (D. W.Va. 1962). 
48. 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959) (hereinafter cited as Mueller). 
49. MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964). 
50. Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416, 419·20 (D. Minn. 1959). 
51. 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960). 
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such corporation arising out of the act or acts which create any 
of the following relationships: . . . 
(2) The doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences 
to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort."52 
A reasonable interpretation of this statute would appear to allow 
a Michigan court to entertain every conceivable product liability 
action having some relationship to the forum. Matters of constitu-
tional authority would, therefore, be the limiting factor to exercis-
ing jurisdiction. However, it would still be possible, even with this 
statute, for a court to refuse jurisdiction for lack of statutory author-
ity where the plaintiff sustains injuries outside the state. No 
"consequences" would have occurred within the forum and, under 
the Pennsylvania interpretation, no "act" would have occurred 
within the state, even if the product had been shipped directly to 
the forum. 
B. The Evils of Improper Characterization in Statutory 
Construction 
It is elementary that the meaning of a word will vary with the 
context in which it is used.58 It is apparent, therefore, that the 
purpose for which a given classification is made influences the con-
tent to be given the language used to express that purpose. Never-
theless, many courts have a tendency to assume that a word used 
in a number of different contexts will have the same meaning in 
all of them.54 This has been particularly true in the application of 
"long-arm" statutes to product liability cases because the contacts 
with which the court must deal do not normally fit into traditional 
jurisdictional categories such as actual presence of the defendant 
within the state. The only contact may be the inanimate product 
itself, brought into the state not by the nonresident manufacturer 
but by independent transportation agencies. As a result of this 
novelty, the question of whether the contact amounts to a jurisdic-
tionally-sufficient event has often been decided not in terms of the 
statutory objectives but by the significance that the event has in 
other legal concepts. Frequently, the reference has been made to 
52. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 600.715 (1962). (Emphasis added.) 
53. "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a 
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the cir-
cumstances and the time in which it is used." Mr. Justice Holmes, in Towne v. 
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
54. This is strikingly illustrated in Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv., 232 N.Y. 
115, 133 N.E. 371 (1921), where the court had to determine whether a hydroaero-
plane while floating on navigable waters was a "vessel." Professor Walter W. Cook 
has aptly criticized the tendency to solidify -the meaning of words as having "all 
the tenacity of original sin [which] must constantly be guarded against," Coox., 
THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1942), 
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choice of law problems because of the significance a particular event 
has in choosing the applicable law.55 
Under traditional choice of law theory the law governing a tort 
with multi-state implications was that of the state where the injury oc-
curred.56 The injury is viewed as significant because it constitutes the 
last act necessary to establish liability.57 Thus, if the injury occurred 
within the forum, the court could utilize the choice of law criteria 
in the jurisdictional inquiry. While a correct decision might be 
reached-under the tests posited herein-it could foster the notion 
that the choice of law event was the only significant event for juris-
dictional purposes. Carried to its logical extreme, the proposition 
would be that a state had power to assert jurisdiction over non-
residents only when it had power to apply its own laws, a manifestly 
fallacious conclusion. 58 
The statutory language that has particularly troubled the courts 
and led to the analogy with choice of law rules is "tort in whole or 
in part" and "tortious act." The legislatures undoubtedly used these 
words to describe the general sweep of conduct they wanted to 
have adjudicated in the forum, separate provisions usually existing 
for actions in contract.59 But the legislatures had the further ob-
55. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 
435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961). Gray also referred to the operation of the Illinois 
statute of limitations as indicating that the aefendant had caused some legally signifii-
cant event to occur within the forum at the time of injury because it was sufficient to 
start the statute of limitations running. Ibid. In some states, reliance on these statutes to 
resolve jurisdictional issues could lead to curious results. In product liability cases, the 
plaintiff's action will often lie in both negligence and breach of warranty. The relevant 
statutes of limitations for these actions may, however, be triggered by different events: 
the sale activating the statute for warranty, and the injury activating the statute for 
negligence. If a court were to look to these statutes for an answer to the question 
whether the defendant has conducted sufficient activity in the forum upon which to 
base jurisdiction, a specious result would be reached if the sale of the product had 
occurred within the state, but the injury had occurred elsewhere. The defendant 
would have acted sufficiently to be subject to an action for warranty but not for 
an action based upon negligence. Although this hypothetical has not as yet been the 
subject of litigation, the possible disparity indicates the futility in referring to 
other bodies of law to resolve unrelated issues. For a discussion of statutes of 
limitations vis-a-vis actions in negligence and warranty, see Freedman, Statutes of 
Limitations in Products Liability Actions, 497 !Ns. L.J. 328 (1964). 
56. RJ!sTATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 378 (1934). The Restaters have since become 
dissatisfied with this rule and now propose the "interest analysis" approach, which 
applies the law of the state which has the most significant relationship to the 
parties and the events leading to liability. RJ!sTATEMENT (SECOND}, CONFLICT OF LAws 
§ 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964). 
57. RJ!sTATEMENT, CONFLIGr OF LAws § 377 (1934). 
58. Compare Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), with Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. 235 (1958). Additionally, choice-of-law rules can consider the relationships 
with the forum of the plaintiff and third parties such as medical creditors, Griffith 
v. United Airlines, Inc., 33 U.S.L WEEK 2218 (Pa. Oct. 14, 1964), while the jurisdic• 
tional inquiry ought to focus exclusively on the defendant. 
59. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1(3) (Supp. 1964); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 
3083 (1961). 
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jective of acquiring jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who 
had committed single acts within the state, as opposed to the tradi-
tional, and now discarded, requirement that the defendant must 
have been "doing business" within the state. Since International 
Shoe specified that isolated acts which are unrelated to the cause 
of actioh could not serve as a basis for jurisdiction,60 the legislatures 
were compelled to ensure that the activity to which the courts 
directed their attention to establish jurisdiction would be associated 
with the cause of action for which relief was sought. In prescribing 
jurisdiction over actions in tort, they therefore described the sig-
nificant isolated acts as those which were "tortious" or "part" of a 
tort. 
The error committed by some courts was in attempting to give 
substantive content to this language instead of treating it as in-
tended-a description of a contact upon which jurisdiction was to be 
predicated. The error could have been avoided by looking at the 
primary source of jurisdictional law, the International Shoe opinion, 
which did not command that the contact itself be capable of sus-
taining liability. It had only to be related to the events leading to 
liability. But imbued with the desire to attribute substantive 
significance to the contact under the law of torts, many courts set 
out to discover if any wrongful activity had occurred within the 
forum. As a result, some said that the negligent act of incorpor-
ating the defect into the product was the only wrongful element 
of a tort, refusing to exercise jurisdiction if that event had not 
occurred within the forum.61 Others realized that this was the 
precise situation in which the legislature had wanted the courts 
to exercise jurisdiction. They supported their decision by looking 
to choice of law rules that focussed exclusively on the incidence of 
injury and found that the injury, not the negligence, was the only 
wrongful element of a tort.62 Finally, some courts recognized the 
error of drawing an analogy with choice of law rules. But in re-
jecting this analogy they committed the additional error of dis-
carding the incidence of injury as a jurisdictionally-sufficient event 
under the statute.63 While they eliminated the choice of law ap-
proach, they retained the idea that the statute requires the 
contact to have significance under the law of torts. The weakness 
of this approach was recently illustrated by a court faced with an 
attempt to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident where neither 
60. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). 
61. See, e.g., Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959); Hellriegel 
v. Sears Roebuck &: Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Cf. Dimeo v. Minster 
Mach. Co., 225 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1963). 
62. See Gray v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 
N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
63. See Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F. Supp. 571 (D. W.Va. 1962). 
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the negligence nor the injury had occurred within the forum.M 
The offending object had been distributed within the forum, how-
ever, and the court recognized that this was a jurisdictionally-
sufficient event. But the court still felt compelled to attribute some 
wrongful quality to this act and therefore concluded that the 
circulation of the product, a defective geologist's hammer, was a-
nalogous to the creation of an enjoinable nuisance within the forum.65 
The fallacy of this approach rests in its circuity. In order to assert 
jurisdiction, the court felt compelled to find something representing 
wrongful conduct committed in the forum, while the whole purpose 
of asserting jurisdiction was to determine whether any tortious 
conduct had in fact taken place. Moreover, that the legislatures did 
not intend to restrict the application of the statute only to substan-
tively determinative incidents committed by the defendant is but-
tressed by the language itself, which speaks of parts of a tort or tor-
tious acts. In the light of these considerations, it is suggested that any 
facet of the events leading to the defendant's liability-be it the neg-
ligent manufacture, the distribution of the product, or the resulting 
injury-is a proper basis upon which to assert jurisdiction under 
these single-act statutes. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The shadowy boundaries of due process limitations on the asser-
tion of jurisdiction over nonresidents and the interpretative difficul-
ties the courts have encountered with respect to the language of the 
"long-arm" provisions have often caused courts to dismiss actions that 
constitutionally could have been entertained. Occasionally these 
decisions are explainable by the legislature's reluctance for policy 
reasons to confer maximum jurisdictional reach on their courts.66 
For example, a state with a great number of manufacturing concerns 
may limit the reach of its own statute in the hope that other states 
will reciprocate, thereby protecting local industries to some extent 
from defending suits in distant states. Section l.03(a)(4) of the 
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act61 reflects such 
policy considerations by prohibiting jurisdiction in cases where acts 
or omissions outside the state cause injury within the state unless 
the nonresident "regularly does or solicits business, or engages in 
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue 
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state." 
If a state should desire, however, to exercise the full scope of 
constitutional possibilities in bringing nonresident manufacturers 
64. Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964). 
65. 250 N.Y.S.2d at 221. 
66. See Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 405 Pa. 12, 173 A.2d 123 (1961). 
67. 9B U.L.A. p. 78 (Supp. 1964). 
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before their courts in product liability cases, it is suggested that the 
legislature delete the above-quoted language from section l.03(a)(4) 
of the uniform act and, in addition, amend section l.03(a) after sub-
division (6) by adding a new paragraph to read as follows: "For 
purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to have been trans-
acting business in this state whenever his product is distributed in 
this state." 
Should a state legislature fear that such expanded jurisdictional 
powers would offer opportunities for unwarranted harassment of 
nonresident defendants, it could further amend the statute to require, 
on motion by the defendant, that the plaintiff post bond to cover 
the defendant's expenses of suit in the event the court later discovers 
that the complaint was frivolous.68 
Harry B. Cummins 
68. The Wisconsin legislature has provided that on motion by the defendant, 
the plaintiff shall post bond to reimburse the defendant for his litigation expenses 
if the action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The amount recoverable is 
limited to $500. WIS. STAT. § 262.20(1) (1963). The Michigan legislature has pro-
vided a similar procedure by which the defendant may be reimbursed for his 
litigation expenses, excluding attorney's fees. However, the statute goes even further 
than the Wisconsin provision by permitting recovery whenever the plaintiff loses on 
the merits. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.741 (1962). 
